Analysis Attack on Sydney Harbour

1 analysis

1.1 failures in allied defences
1.2 flaws in japanese tactics
1.3 uss chicago s survival
1.4 bombardment impact

analysis

the attack on sydney harbour ended in failure on both sides, , revealed flaws in both allied defences , japanese tactics. during primary attack, japanese lost 3 midget submarines in exchange sinking of single barracks ship. subsequent operations no more successful 5 large japanese submarines sank 3 merchant ships , caused minimal property damage during 2 bombardments. performance of allied defenders equally poor. however, 1 historian states lack of damage in sydney harbour due combination of luck , aggressive counter-attack .

the main impact of midget submarine attack , subsequent operations psychological; dispelling belief sydney immune japanese attack , highlighting australia s proximity pacific war. there no official inquiry attacks, despite demand sections of media, there concern inquiry lead defeatism , reduce faith in john curtin s government, particularly after damaging inquiry australian defences had followed japanese aerial attack on darwin 3 months earlier.

failures in allied defences

the allies failed respond adequately several warnings of japanese activity off east coast of australia prior attack; ignored warnings or explained them away. attributed unsuccessful attack on freighter wellen on 16 may single submarine, , assumed had departed australian waters after attack. first reconnaissance flight went unnoticed, , although frumel intercepted report , distributed allied commanders on 30 may, muirhead-gould apparently did not react. new zealand naval authorities detected radio chatter between japanese submarines on 26 , 29 may, , although not decrypt transmissions, radio direction finding indicated submarine or submarines approaching sydney. allies considered dispatching anti-submarine patrol in response 29 may fix, unable anti-submarine craft committed protecting northbound troop convoy. response second reconnaissance flight on 29 may launching of search planes. no other defence measures put place. although midget attack on diego suarez in madagascar occurred on morning of 31 may (sydney time), allies sent no alert other command regions, believed vichy french forces had launched attack.

muirhead-gould in may 1941

historians have questioned competence of senior allied officers. muirhead-gould had been hosting dinner party on night of attack, , 1 of main guests senior united states navy officer in sydney harbour, captain howard bode of uss chicago. both officers sceptical attack taking place. muirhead-gould arrived aboard hmas lolita @ approximately midnight, action described attempting learn situation. members of lolita s crew later recounted when muirhead-gould came aboard chastised patrol boat s skipper , crew, , dismissed report. junior officers on chicago provided similar descriptions of bode s return on board, , members of both crews later claimed muirhead-gould , bode intoxicated. after destruction of hmas kuttabul both officers began take attack seriously.

during attack, there several delays between events , responses them. on 2 hours passed between observation of m-14 in boom net , muirhead-gould s first order ships commence anti-submarine actions. took 2 hours mobilise auxiliary patrol boats, did not leave anchorage further hour. part of these delays due lack of effective communications. none of auxiliary patrol craft in harbour had radio communications, instructions , reports came signal lights via port war signal station or garden island, or physical communication via launches. in muirhead-gould s preliminary report on attack, stated port war signal station not designed volume of communications traffic attack caused. telephone communications garden island unreliable during part of attack, , first torpedo explosion disabled them completely.

the need keep information secret may have contributed delays , defenders scepticism. auxiliary patrol boat crews, indicator loop staff, , other personnel manning defensive positions have been outside need know , not have been informed of incidents prior attack, not have been alert, contributing disbelief demonstrated in hours of attack.

flaws in japanese tactics

m-21 being raised floating crane on 10 june 1942



the wreckage of m-21

the main flaw in japanese plans use of midget submarines primary attack. midget submarines intended operate during fleet actions: released modified seaplane carriers run amok through enemy fleet. concept went out of favour changing japanese naval thinking , experience led recognition naval warfare centre around carrier-supported aerial combat. result, midget program s focus changed infiltration of enemy harbours, attack vessels @ anchor. concept failed during attack on pearl harbor, midgets had no effect, , tying 11 large submarines 6 weeks in support of further midget submarine attacks on sydney , diego suarez proved waste of resources.

moreover, failures @ sydney harbour , diego suarez demonstrated improvements midget submarines made after pearl harbor had not increased overall impact of midget program. modifications had various effects. ability man , deploy midgets while mother ships submerged prevented army coastal radars detecting mother submarines. however, midgets still difficult control, unstable, , prone surfacing or diving uncontrollably. these manoeuvrability issues contributed m-14 s entanglement in anti-submarine net, , repeated detection of m-21 , m-24.

beyond use of unreliable midgets, historians have identified areas in plan of attack japanese have done more damage. if japanese midget submarines had conducted simultaneous, co-ordinated attack, have overwhelmed defences. chance more damage came following destruction of kuttabul, when several naval vessels headed sea, including uss chicago, uss perkins, dutch submarine k-ix, hmas whyalla, , hmis bombay. 5 mother submarines en route port hacking recovery position, , although sasaki s plan @ pearl harbor had been leave submarines @ harbour mouth pick off fleeing vessels, did not repeat tactic.

uss chicago s survival

several factors beyond control of of combatants contributed survival of uss chicago. @ time of m-24 s attack on chicago, latter had spent time preparing depart sydney harbour, , although still moored , stationary, producing large volumes of white smoke boilers warmed up. smoke, streaming aft under influence of wind, , contrasting against dark, low-lying cloud, may have given impression chicago moving, causing m-24 lead target when firing torpedoes, , consequently sending torpedoes across bow. factor may have influenced chicago s survival extinguishing of garden island s floodlights minutes before m-24 fired first torpedo, impeding targeting.

bombardment impact

a crowd looking @ shell hole @ woollahra on 8 june 1942

the bombardments failed cause significant physical damage, had major psychological impact on residents of sydney , newcastle. due inaccuracy of submarines range-finding equipment, coupled unstable firing platform of submarine @ sea, specific targeting impossible. intention of submarine bombardment frighten population of target area.

the failure of majority of shells detonate may have had various causes. submarines fired armour piercing shells, intended use against steel ship hulls, relatively softer brick walls may have failed trigger impact fuses. sea water may have degraded shells, japanese had stored in deck lockers several weeks. age of shells may have been factor; of shells recovered newcastle bombardment found of english manufacture: surplus munitions world war i.

in sydney, fear of impending japanese invasion caused people move west; housing prices in eastern suburbs dropped, while beyond blue mountains rose significantly. attack led significant increase in membership of volunteer defence organisations, , strengthening of defences in sydney harbour , port newcastle.