Examples of constructive ambiguities in diplomacy Constructive ambiguity

1 examples of constructive ambiguities in diplomacy

1.1 un security council s resolution 242
1.2 shanghai communiqué
1.3 6-point agreement
1.4 syrian-israeli peace negotiations
1.5 sinn féin

examples of constructive ambiguities in diplomacy
un security council s resolution 242

the un security council agreed on text of resolution 242 after crushing defeat israel inflicted on joint arab forces during 6 day war in 1967. result of bargaining between powers sitting in security council, resolution reflected polarized political opinion. provision of resolution prompted different , incompatible interpretations 1 following preamble of text, reading: establishment of , lasting peace in middle east should include application of both following principles:

withdrawal of israeli armed forces territories occupied in recent conflict;
termination of claims or states of belligerency , respect for…territorial integrity…of every state in area , right live in peace within secure , recognized boundaries.

the use of unnatural english construction territories occupied in recent conflict without expected definite article, , made possible question whether israel asked withdraw territories occupied in recent conflict, or withdraw some, not all, such territories. notably, french translation of document, unlike english original, used definite article, demanding retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit . french version, english version official un version of document, suggested israel must withdraw territories occupied during 6 day war.

naturally, french interpretation suited interests of arab countries, made numerous attempts prove validity. contrast, israel opposed such interpretation, , sponsor of resolution, lord caradon, appears have had no intention of inserting definite article text. caradon additionally emphasized additional , clarifying light second part of first provision shed on first part, , insisted must given uppermost consideration. according him, boundary existed before 6 day war did not satisfy right of israel live within secure , recognised boundaries. consequently, under interpretation, israel did not have withdraw pre-six day war borders.

british solicitor john mchugo counters such logic following arguments :

1. warning signs such dogs must kepts on leash near ponds not include words or , yet understood such rules apply dogs , near ponds. 2. preamble resolution, sets out principles on peace action must built (according resolution), mentions principle of inadmissibility of territorial expansion war . this, argues, renders not territories impossible , untenable. 3. last, not least, mchugo argues principle, found in preamble, 1 deals territorial issues, because so-called withdrawal clause deals troop movements.

on basis, mchugo asserts israel cannot lay claim through resolution right keep of territories occupied in 1967.

the shanghai communiqué

the shanghai communiqué issued united states of america , people s republic of china on 27 february 1972, during president richard nixon s visit china. henry kissinger acted principal negotiator in matter. document contained ambiguous provision inserted united states: united states acknowledges chinese on either side of taiwan strait maintain there 1 china , taiwan province of china. provision lent interpretation first expression of american support one-china policy, calling reintegration of taiwan prc. not meant in original context.

the fact acknowledged prc , taiwan agree there 1 china not imply sort of agreement on internal arrangements 1 china. on contrary, long taiwan issue has been posed, chinese governments on either side of taiwan strait have been unable agree on formula reunification, let alone have supported government. nevertheless, official endorsement of term “one china” helped find proper balance between relations prc , relations taiwan, without jeopardizing either. use reflected negotiated instance of constructive ambiguity reduced immediate risk of open conflict.

6-point agreement

in wake of yom kippur war between israel , egypt, both negotiators , belligerents faced issue of status of egyptian third army, surrounded israeli defense force on eastern side of suez. no progress achieved in first phase of peace talks held in october. while talks continued in washington in november, un security council issued resolution 340, demanded israeli force withdraw lines occupied on october 22, 1973, @ 1650 gmt, causing end encirclement of egyptian third army. however, israel refused comply resolution 340. thereafter negotiations fortunately continued , resulted in so-called 6-point agreement , signed on november 11 @ kilometer 101 of cairo-suez road. first agreement israel signed arab country after outbreak of hostilities between arabs , israelis in 1949.

one of chief mediators agreement, henry kissinger, secretary of state, used term constructive ambiguity during negotiations, explain negotiating strategy key purpose of 6-point agreement. provision b of agreement contained ambiguity created incentive israeli negotiators engage in further talks leading israel s compliance sc resolution 340 , ensured talks continue , arrive @ solution save face of 1 of 2 parties. result not have been achieved quick jump or fiat.

provision b says: both sides agree discussions between them begin settle question of return october 22 positions in framework of agreement on disengagement , separation of forces under auspices of un. provided syntactical ambiguity allowed egyptian , israeli negotiators interpret accord in diametrically opposite ways. egyptian negotiators interpreted provision clear demand israel withdraw armed force in accordance united nations security council resolution 340, linking return october 22 positions , under auspices of un . contrast, israeli negotiators interpreted provision calling on parties negotiate separation of forces agreement without specific request return october 22 lines, linking discussions... settle question , under auspices of un .

syrian-israeli peace negotiations

in course of syrian-israeli peace negotiations, call comprehensive, just, , lasting peace replaced formula of full peace full withdrawal in may 1993. former requirement tended link syrian-israeli talks palestinian , other negotiating tracks, whereas latter formula of full peace full withdrawal tended sever such links , ties in favor of separate settlement stands on 2 feet , israelis put it. short-lived constructive ambiguity may have witnessed face-saving attempt syrian president hafez asad maintain coordination among different arab-israeli negotiating tracks while offering israel full contractual peace in return golan heights. revelation of oslo accords between israel , plo in summer of 1993 ended ambiguity, whereas subsequent israeli-jordanian peace treaty of october 1994 rendered irrelevant. syria s neighbors, part, no longer sought comprehensive peace .

sinn féin

sinn féin political party in northern ireland affiliated terrorism while pursuing irish unity. northern ireland special envoy mitchell reiss has pointed out cynical use of constructive ambiguity, when in 1990s, sinn féin adopted strategy labeled tuas . within policy document, acronym meant tactical use of armed struggle ; however, same acronym publicly translated mean totally unarmed strategy.